Category Consumer subscription app: dating and community platform for hikers, based in France · Listed Flippa, Vetted + Data Verified Asking $296,888 (€256,333) · MRR €8,298 · Monthly profit shown €20,833 · Margin 93% Subscribers 1,699 (70% on annual plans) · Churn 7.6% monthly, 0% on annuals · Age 9 months
The listing's own multiples put this at 3.1× profit and 2.9× revenue, both below the 3.9× median for confirmed SaaS transactions. The headline story is a subscriber base that "recently doubled" in two months on the back of a 65,500-member Facebook group, with paid acquisition still untapped.
Two of the numbers Flippa prints on the same metrics box do not agree with each other.
| Risk-adjusted multiple | 2.0× |
| IRR at the asking price | 29% |
| Maximum defensible offer at 30% IRR | $294,000 |
| Annual net revenue retention | 38.7% |
| Half-life of the current customer base | 9 months |
The metrics box shows "Monthly Profit: €20,833" and, three lines down, "Profit Multiple: 3.1×." Both are printed against the same €256,333 asking price.
Annualize the €20,833 and divide it into the price: €256,333 ÷ €250,000 = 1.0×. That is what the deal costs if the headline monthly profit is the real, repeatable rate. Now divide the price by the 3.1× the listing actually displays: €256,333 ÷ 3.1 = €82,688 a year, or €6,891 a month — a third of the number in the metrics box, two lines above it.
Both cannot be the profit €256,333 is priced against. The gap is exactly the shape you'd expect from a subscriber base that "recently doubled ... in 2 months": a batch of new annual subscribers paying a full year upfront inflates the cash collected in the month they sign up, while the trailing-twelve-month average — the number a profit multiple should be built on — still reflects the eight months before the doubling. The listing does not say which of the two figures is the one a buyer is actually paying for.
The 7.6% blended monthly churn, against 1,699 subscribers, is roughly 129 cancellations a month. Annual subscribers, per the listing, contribute close to none of that. The other 30% of the base — about 510 subscribers on monthly plans — is carrying essentially all of it: 129 ÷ 510 ≈ 25% monthly churn on that segment, an average lifetime under four months.
That arithmetic is ours, not the listing's, built from two numbers the listing does disclose (70% annual mix, 7.6% blended churn). The 0% churn on annuals is true and disclosed; it is also the reason the blended figure looks better than what the paying, cancelling minority actually experiences.
| Adjustment | Effect |
|---|---|
| Market median, confirmed SaaS transactions | 3.9× |
| Churn above 5% monthly | −0.9× |
| Single acquisition channel (one Facebook community, paid acquisition untapped) | −0.5× |
| Short track record (9 months) | −0.5× |
| Risk-adjusted | 2.0× |
Reversing the model's own conservative baseline — current MRR held flat, new signups assumed only to offset churn rather than repeat the recent doubling — the maximum price that still clears a 30% IRR over three years is $294,000, using the €6,891-a-month profit figure implied by the listing's own 3.1× multiple, not the €20,833 headline number.
$294,000, structured 65% at close and 35% in a twelve-month earnout tied to the business sustaining at least €18,000 of monthly profit, measured on the same basis Stripe shows it, for three consecutive months post-close.
That structure puts the burden of proof exactly where the ambiguity sits: if the €20,833 figure is real and repeatable, the seller collects the earnout in full within a year. If it was a one-time bump from a batch of annual renewals, the buyer isn't the one who finds that out the hard way. Either way, the question of which profit number is real should be answered with the seller's Stripe export before any offer goes out, not inferred from a metrics box after closing.
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